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Bush Unwavering in Push for Conservative Bench; White House Gets its way on Many
Judgeships
USA Today
May 8, 2003
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON -- Filibusters dominate the
headlines, and Republicans and Democrats
say the Senate's judicial confirmation process
is broken. But a defiant Bush administration
is pushing through most of its plan to make
the federal bench more conservative.
Two years ago Friday, President Bush
announced his first slate of proposed judges.
Since then, the White House consistently has
refused to surrender to Senate Democrats
who have tried to block conservative
nominees from lifetime appointments to the
bench.
In all, 123 nominees have been approved to
the 862-seat judiciary during the past two
years. And though Senate filibusters of
Washington lawyer Miguel Estrada and
Texas judge Priscilla Owen have drawn
much attention, the White House has won
Senate approval of several other eminent
conservatives. They include a leading states'
rights advocate, a scholar who has argued
against abortion rights, an opponent of the
Supreme Court's landmark Miranda ruling
that requires police to read suspects their
rights, and two controversial former aides to
Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C.
Overall, the administration has:
* Preserved a strategy of tightly controlling
the selection process, including eliminating
the American Bar Association's 50- year role
in screening candidates.
* Refused to compromise with Democrats
who have pushed for more moderate
candidates. After a Senate committee
rejected Owen and Mississippi trial judge
Charles Pickering, the administration simply
nominated them again to the U.S. appeals
court that covers Texas, Louisiana and
Mississippi.
* Remained focused, even when Democrats
took control of the Senate in mid-2001, on
finding conservatives who Bush believes
would narrowly interpret individual rights
and not try to use the courts to solve
perceived problems in society. (Republicans
now hold a 51- 48 edge in the Senate, which
has one independent.)
"From the very beginning, the president has
emphasized the need for a
well-functioning . . . federal judiciary," says
Viet Dinh, assistant U.S. attorney general in
the Office of Legal Policy. "That emphasis
has not wavered."
Two long-pending nominees, Washington
lawyer John Roberts and Los Angeles judge
Carolyn Kuhl, are scheduled for votes today
in the GOP- led Senate Judiciary committee.
One question is whether Kuhl -- who as a
Reagan administration lawyer sought to
reverse Roe vs. Wade, the ruling that
legalized abortion nationwide -- will face a
filibuster.
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"The president has fought and will fight for
his nominations," says a senior
administration official shepherding
nominations. He noted that when Bush
announced his first nominees May 9, 2001,
he emphasized their significance by
presenting them in the White House's historic
East Room.
Of those 11 nominees, seven have been
confirmed. Roberts, who has Democratic
support, could become the eighth. The
remaining three are Owen; Estrada, the first
Hispanic nominated to the appeals court for
the District of Columbia Circuit; and
Terrence Boyle, a North Carolina trial judge
tapped for an appeals court covering Mid-
Atlantic states.
"The president appears to be going for
broke," says Barbara Perry, a government
professor at Sweet Briar College in Virginia
who follows judicial nominations.
Bush's push for a more conservative bench
continues amid anticipation of a possible
Supreme Court vacancy. Retirement rumors
constantly swirl around Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, 78, and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, 73. Both were appointed by
GOP presidents and may be inclined to retire
while a Republican is in the White House.
The current atmosphere has led some
analysts to say that if a high court opening
arose, the administration would pick a hard-
right nominee and Senate Democrats would
consider a filibuster to block the nominee.
Stopping a filibuster requires 60 votes, rather
than the usual majority of 51.
Democrats have closed ranks to filibuster
Estrada, a former clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Some Democrats
criticize Estrada for declining to elaborate on
his judicial views and call him "ultra
far-right." Owen, who is on Texas' Supreme
Court, has drawn criticism for opinions
against young women seeking to get
abortions without telling their parents and for
decisions in which she favored business over
workers.
For all the wrangling over nominations,
Democrats have joined with the GOP to
approve 123 of Bush's 184 picks since spring
2001.
Vermont Sen. Patrick Leahy, ranking
Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, says
Democrats have not been obstructionists.
"The president has been a divider and not a
uniter with many nominees. We have drawn
a line with a few of his most extreme
choices."
Last week, the Senate voted 52-41 to
approve Jeffrey Sutton, a Columbus, Ohio,
lawyer who successfully argued states' rights
cases at the U.S. Supreme Court. Advocates
for the disabled protested him, saying his
work undercut federal anti-bias protections.
He joins the appeals court covering Ohio,
Kentucky, Michigan and Tennessee.
In November, after the GOP won Senate
control, two high-profile nominees were
approved for key appeals courts: University
of Utah law professor Michael McConnell,
known for writings against abortion and for
equal government funding of non-religious
and religious programs; and former
Thurmond aide and trial judge Dennis Shedd,
who overcame criticism that he unfairly ruled
against workers and consumers.
Another ex-Thurmond aide, Terry Wooten,
was approved to a trial court post in South
Carolina. University of Utah professor Paul
Cassell, an opponent of the Miranda
equirement, won a trial court seat in Utah.
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The Judiciary Committee is likely to soon
reconsider Pickering, who was rejected by
the panel when Democrats controlled it.
They denounced his views on racial issues
and abortion rights. Bush is standing by
Pickering. Some Democrats say that could
mean another filibuster.
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HIGH COURT NOMINATIONS MAY HINGE ON FILIBUSTER DEBATE SENATE
IS DIVIDED ON CONSTITUTIONALITY
The Boston Globe
June 2, 2003
Lyle Denniston, Globe Correspondent
WASHINGTON - Talk of a possible vacancy
on the Supreme Court is rising with the
arrival of June and the last month of the
current term. If there is an opening, however,
a nominee's fate may depend on what
happens to the filibuster rule in the Senate,
now under siege. A filibuster, one of the
Senate's most cherished eccentricities, is a
debate that can go on and on - a blocking
maneuver that works simply because it is so
hard to stop in a closely divided Senate. This
year, its use against lower court nominations
has run on for months.
The continuing slowdown on two
conservative nominees is widely regarded as
a rehearsal for coming battles if a Supreme
Court justice retires and President Bush picks
a controversial replacement.
Aware of that prospect, and frustrated by the
current filibuster, President Bush last month
complained that "we are facing a crisis in the
Senate, and therefore a crisis in our
judiciary."
But the Democratic leader in the Senate, Tom
Daschle of South Dakota, has said there is no
crisis and there is nothing wrong with the
filibuster rule. "If it ain't broke, don't fix it,"
he said in May. The precedent for
filibustering judicial nominations was set in
1968 when Republican senators thwarted the
Democratic nomination of Justice Abe Fortas
to become chief justice. The technique was
not renewed on judgeships until this year,
when Democrats brought it back to try to
head off two of Bush's nominees to federal
appeals courts - Miguel Estrada and Priscilla
Owen.
As the Supreme Court's future is pondered,
the filibuster looms large in the background.
The filibuster is now under fierce challenge
in all three branches of government. The
most drastic form of a challenge would
involve a ruling from the Senate chair,
occupied for the occasion by Vice President
Dick Cheney, that filibusters no longer can
be used against judicial nominees - a simple,
unmistakable display of power that could
leave the Democratic minority with no option
but to stall virtually all Senate business.
"It is not called the nuclear option for
nothing," said Elliot M. Mincberg, legal
director of People for the American Way, a
liberal group that supports the current
filibustering.
This is not something that either Republican
or Democratic senators are actively talking
about in public, because it looks drastic in the
gentle- mannered Senate. But lobbyists seem
preoccupied with it these days.
Supporters of the option, like conservative
legal advocate Jay Alan Sekulow of the
American Center for Law and Justice, prefer
to call it "the constitutional option." They
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argue that filibusters aimed at judicial
nominations are unconstitutional, and their
option would simply restore majority rule on
those nominations.
Short of that option, there are other
challenges building. The president, reaching
deep into the Senate's own affairs, has
suggested that the chamber speed up its
process on judgeships. The Senate's own
Republican leadership is seeking to weaken
the filibuster rule.
The rule is also under assault from a number
of conservative activist groups. And among
academics, there is a continuing debate
whether the filibuster is unconstitutional. The
Senate will begin formal study of all of the
options on Thursday, when its Rules
Committee holds an afternoon hearing.
One conservative group, Judicial Watch - a
legal advocacy organization that in nine
years of existence has brought suit more than
100 times, mainly against the government -
has filed a lawsuit claiming that the filibuster
of judgeship nominees is unconstitutional.
Judicial Watch asked the US District Court to
strike down the filibuster rule and order the
Senate and its officers to let the two pending
appeals court nominations come to a final
vote - one that would ensure the nominees'
confirmation.
In a rare display of agreement on the
emotionally charged subject of filibusters,
the Senate last month voted unanimously and
without debate to defend itself against that
lawsuit.
At this point, however, it is unclear what the
Senate's defense will be. Some freshman
Senate Republicans have talked publicly
about pursuing the constitutional claim in
court themselves, so there may be some
resistance to mounting a legal argument that
the issue is none of the courts' business. The
Senate Legal Counsel will begin framing a
defense shortly.
Each of the several options has its critics, but
there is no consensus yet that all of them
ultimately will fail.
The new rumbling over the filibuster can be
traced to simple numbers: the 100- member
Senate is divided 51-49, with Republicans
holding control. The filibuster this year has
taken that control away from them on at least
two court nominations.
Senate Rule 22, the filibuster rule, requires
60 votes, not a majority of 51, to stop a
filibuster and let the Senate proceed to a final
vote. That means that if 41 senators want to
keep a filibuster going, it can't be stopped
because 59 opposing votes would not be
enough.
Although changing the Senate rules
ordinarily would require only a simple
majority of 51 votes, a proposed change can
itself be filibustered, and another Senate rule
says it takes 67 votes (not 60) to end a
filibuster against a rule change. That means
34 senators can block a rule change even if
66 want it.
Senate rules would have to be changed to
adopt President Bush's suggestion for a more
rapid timetable of Senate review of judicial
nominees or to approve a Senate GOP
leaders' proposal to reduce in steps the votes
required to shut off a filibuster, from 60 to 51.
Both ideas, if they make it to the Senate floor,
would be subject to filibuster.
Thus, two out of three options now being
discussed may be in for a seemingly endless
struggle. Advocates on opposite sides of the
filibuster controversy, like Mincberg and
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Sekulow, agreed that the two options
suggested by Bush and Senate GOP leaders
could be doomed.
That is what has brought on talk of the third
option. It would work this way: Republicans
would raise a parliamentary point that Rule
22 does not apply at all to judicial
nominations, and so a majority of 51
prevails.
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Bush Spurns Proposal on Court Picks; White House Rejects Democrats' Offer to
Consult on Supreme Court Nominations
Los Angeles Times
June 19, 2003
David G. Savage
WASH[NGTON -- The White House gave a
"thanks, but no thanks" reply Wednesday to
an offer from Senate Democrats to consult
with the president before he nominates any
justices to the Supreme Court. President
Bush's top legal advisor left no doubt that the
choice -- when or if there is one -- will be the
president's alone.
"If a Supreme Court vacancy arises during
his presidency, President Bush will nominate
an individual of high integrity, intellect and
experience," White House Counsel Alberto R.
Gonzales said in a letter to Senate
Democrats.
Then "the Senate will have an opportunity to
assess the president's nominee and ... to vote
up or down," he added.
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer
also dismissed the Democrats' offer as a
"1novel new approach" to choosing Supreme
Court justices.
In the last week, several Democrats have
written Bush to say that he could avoid a
battle over the Supreme Court by talking
with them about a consensus nominee.
"I stand ready to work with you to help select
a nominee or nominees to the Supreme
Court," Sen. Patrick J. Leahy
(D-Vt.), the ranking Democrat on the
Judiciary Committee, said in a June 11 letter
to Bush.
He noted that Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) has taken
credit for advising President Clinton to select
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer
for the high court.
"Meaningful bipartisan consultation in
advance of any Supreme Court nomination"
would prevent a "divisive confirmation
fight," said Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle (D-S.D.) on Tuesday.
Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), another
Judiciary Committee member, offered Bush
a few possible nominees, including
Republican Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.).
Republican leaders and conservative scholars
say they are taken aback by the Democrats'
claim to have a role in the nomination
process.
"I am astounded by those letters. Does
Charles Schumer think he is the president?"
asked law professor John Eastman.
A former clerk to Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas, Eastman teaches at
Chapman University Law School in Orange
and recently advised Senate Republicans on
the constitutionality of filibusters. "The
president has the sole power to nominate, and
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only then does the Senate give its advice and
consent," Eastman said.
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas), the newest
Republican on the Judiciary Committee, also
urged Bush to ignore the Democrats. "Few
things would politicize our judiciary more
than to hand over control of the process for
selecting Supreme Court justices to
individual members of the Senate," Comyn
said. "Presidents, not politicians, nominate
justices."
The debate about the Senate's role in
confirming judges is an old one, and it tends
to flare up when Supreme Court seats are at
stake. At the moment, there is speculation
that one or more of the justices will retire this
month at the end of the court's current term.
The Constitution says the president "shall
nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges
of the Supreme Court."
On Wednesday, Sen. Barbara Boxer
(D-Calif.) cited this "advice and consent"
clause in describing judicial appointments as
"a 50-50 deal."
She added: "The president, in this process, is
not more important than the Senate, and the
Senate's not more important. They have to
work together."
Boxer and other Democrats base their view
on historians who say that early drafts of the
Constitution gave the Senate the power to
appoint officials. The final version of the
Constitution, though, made it clear that the
power to nominate judges and other officials
rests with the president.
Liberal and conservative activists are gearing
up for an all-out battle, and the Senate
Judiciary Committee has cleared its calendar
for possible hearings this summer.
But none of the justices has hinted at
retirement; instead, they have spoken of their
plans for the fall session.
Fleischer dismissed the talk of any Supreme
Court nomination as "idle chatter."
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GETTING GUNS READY FOR NEXT NOMINATIONS WAR
The Recorder
June 9, 2003
Jonathan Groner and Tony Mauro
WASHINGTON - As the clock ticks down to
a possible retirement on the Supreme Court,
partisans on all sides are gearing up for what
promises to be the bloodiest confirmation
battle in a dozen years.
Republicans have already met in the
conference room of a D.C. law firm to
brainstorm a campaign on behalf of any
nominee. Senate Judiciary Committee
staffers are at the ready. And leaders of
liberal groups are canceling vacations and
charting plans for the opposition fight.
"We've been preparing for this moment,
really, since the day Bush was elected, or
chosen," says Kate Michelman, president of
NARAL Pro-Choice America and a veteran
of battles over Robert Bork in 1987 and
Clarence Thomas in 1991.
When the court term ends later this month, it
is still highly possible that neither Chief
Justice William Rehnquist nor Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor - the subjects of most
retirement rumors - will step down. But that
has not stopped the speculation, nor has it
slowed the preparation throughout
Washington in the event that President Bush
gets to fill the first Supreme Court vacancy in
nine years.
"We have a fully staffed nominations unit
and are preparing for a potential retirement in
addition to working on filling the empty
spaces on the federal bench," says Margarita
Tapia, spokeswoman for Judiciary
Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch, R-Utah.
Other senators say they have not beefed up
their staffs yet, but some vacancies have been
filled with veterans of past nomination wars -
such as Sen. Edward Kennedy's, D-Mass.,
new committee counsel Jim Flug, who first
worked with Kennedy in the 1960s.
Outside government, the first tangible sign
that war councils are convening came on
May 22, when about two dozen highly placed
Republicans gathered at the offices of Jones
Day overlooking the Capitol.
The three-hour session brought together in
one room GOP executive-branch veterans of
earlier nomination wars over Bork and
Thomas, as well as key point people who
hold the same positions today. Several
Republican Senate staffers were also present.
"It was a collective sharing of memories
about what happened then," says attendee C.
Boyden Gray, a partner at Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering who was White House counsel
when the first President Bush nominated
Thomas.
Gray heads the Committee for Justice, a
group that presses for confirmation of Bush
judicial nominees. "The purpose was to
inform the current people so they don't have
to reinvent the wheel," he says.
According to several people who were
present, Gray was joined at the meeting by
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Charles Cooper, former assistant attorney
general for legal counsel; Michael Carvin,
former deputy assistant attorney general for
legal counsel, and Lee Liberman Otis, former
assistant White House counsel and a founder
of the Federalist Society who was a key
player in Thomas' confirmation fight in 1991.
Cooper is now a partner at Cooper & Kirk,
Carvin is a partner at Jones Day, and Otis is
general counsel of the Department of Energy.
"This was a meeting of a group of
conservatives engaged in nomination fights
in the past or the present who are concerned
that we don't have another Borking," says a
GOP Senate aide who was not present but
heard about the meeting in detail.
Gray says ideological issues and the makeup
of the Supreme Court didn't come up at the
session, which was totally devoted to
practical nitty-gritty issues.
"We told them, 'Here's what to do if there is a
vacancy,"' Gray says. "Where to have the war
room, things like that."
Says another lawyer who was present but
requested anonymity: "No specific decisions
were made at the meeting. It was simply
about what to expect and how to prepare
yourselves for it. An older generation of
experienced hands were passing on their
insights to the current generation in the
executive branch and on the Hill."
Among the topics that participants say were
discussed were the importance of developing
a press strategy and the need to respond
quickly to themes and issues raised by
Democrats regarding a nominee.
Several sources confirm that Associate
White House Counsel Brett Kavanaugh, who
has been working on judicial nominations
since the start of the administration, was one
of the current officials at the meeting.
Kavanaugh declines comment, as do Cooper
and Carvin. Otis was traveling and
unavailable for comment.
One lawyer who was at the May meeting
says a follow-up session has not been
scheduled, but the GOP Senate aide says he
wouldn't be surprised if one is held later this
month.
John Nowacki, a conservative strategist who
declined to say whether he attended the
meeting, said Bush supporters are
anticipating all-out war. "No matter who is
nominated, what we've seen so far with the
lower court nominees will pale in
comparison," says Nowacki, director of legal
policy at the Free Congress Foundation,
whose predecessors were also active during
the Bork and Thomas battles.
Nowacki says his group will defend Bush
nominees and also hopes to win public
support in the ongoing debate over the role of
filibusters in blocking judicial nominations.
That issue, currently the subject of Senate
maneuvering, could come to the fore if
Democrats threaten to filibuster a high court
nominee.
"Americans have a sense of fairness, and
they will want to know why the Democrats
don't want an up or down vote," says
Nowacki.
ITCHING FOR A FIGHT
For their part, liberal groups that are likely to
oppose a Bush nominee have yet to convene
a mass meeting on Supreme Court
nomination strategy, but work is under way
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researching the backgrounds of potential
nominees.
Nan Aron, longtime president of the
umbrella group Alliance for Justice, still
holds out hope that no vacancy will occur.
"Does the administration really want a big
fight a year before the election?" asks Aron,
whose group is the lead liberal umbrella
group on judicial nominations. "It certainly
didn't help the first President Bush that
Clarence Thomas was fought over the year
before his re-election campaign."
Aron also says that if there is a vacancy,
liberal opposition to a Bush nominee is not
automatic. "I'm very serious about that," she
says.
But when asked about White House counsel
Alberto Gonzales - usually viewed as the
most politically palatable possibility for
Democrats - Aron answers without
hesitation.
"We would mount a fight on Gonzales,"
Aron says. The target would not be Gonzales'
record on the Texas Supreme Court, but
rather his work as White House counsel and
his advocacy of administration policies on
civil liberties, judicial nominations, and other
issues. "We can and will prevail" against
Gonzales or any other nominee that is
opposed by a broad coalition, Aron says.
A grass-roots campaign on a Bush nominee
will look substantially different from the
ones mounted against Bork and Thomas,
says NARAL's Michelman.
Through its e-mail network, Michelman
says, her organization can quickly contact
750,000 people. "This capacity to mobilize,
to educate, to inform, and to activate, is
enormously powerful," she notes.
Michelman says she has already laid the
groundwork with senators who favor the
right to choose.
"We have made it clear we expect
pro-choice senators to filibuster any nominee
who does not view the right to choose as a
fundamental constitutional right," says
Michelman. "Merely stating that Roe v.
Wade is settled law is not good enough."
Ralph Neas, president of People for the
American Way, also says the filibuster
option is part of the arsenal that opponents
will use if necessary. Since 60 votes are
needed to end a filibuster, opponents would
need only 41 senators to block a nominee.
"But we have a good shot at 51 votes too,"
says Neas, who was a key player in prior
battles as head of the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights. Neas says he and his family
took a vacation in January in anticipation of
the time demands a nomination battle will
create for him this summer. Grass-roots
mobilization will be crucial to win, Neas says,
and his 600,000 members are ready to form
the core of a "progressive army" of millions.
NEW FACES ON THE LEFT
Not all the leaders of the likely opposition
are veterans of the Bork and Thomas battles.
Aron expects that labor and disabilities rights
groups will be more visible. Most of all, Aron
predicts that environmental groups - minor
players in the confirmation battles over Bork
and Thomas - will be important new
combatants.
"There's a level of awareness in the
environmental community about the threat
involved in judicial nominations that was not
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there even two years ago," says Douglas
Kendall, executive director of the
Community Rights Counsel, an
environmental and land use group that has
focused on judicial nominees for years.
Environmental issues are the subject of only
a few Supreme Court cases per term, and the
court's track record is mixed. But the potency
of environmental laws can rise or fall on a
wide range of Supreme Court rulings on
issues of standing, the commerce clause,
takings, 11th Amendment and the separation
of powers, Kendall notes.
Kendall's group and Earthjustice -formerly
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund - have
formed an alliance to beef up environmental
groups' research and advocacy in anticipation
of a Supreme Court vacancy.
They, like others, are building files on the
most-mentioned potential nominees, and
they have been active on lower court
nominees. A substantial number of senators
opposing Miguel Estrada for the D.C. Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals have cited
environmental concerns among others.
Estrada's nomination, approved by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, has been shut down by
a months-long filibuster.
"We generated tens of thousands of
messages into senators" on Estrada and other
nominees, says Glenn Sugameli, senior
legislative counsel with Earthjustice. For a
Supreme Court nominee, he says, "We're
talking about research, media, education,
lobbying, outreach, networking, all of it. It
will be a very high-profile issue for the
national environmental community."
At least one other familiar face from past
nomination battles has not gotten energized
yet. Harvard Law School professor Laurence
Tribe, who advised Senate Democrats on
constitutional issues before the Bork and
Thomas hearings, said in an e-mail last week,
"I'm thinking as little about this as I can
manage and am resisting requests to become
involved. When the time comes, I suspect the
force will become irresistible and I will get
drawn in. But not without protest. For some
reason, I'm feeling fatalistic about things this
time around."
Tony Mauro is Supreme Court
correspondent and Jonathan Groner is editor
at large at The Recorder's Washington, D.C.,
affiliate Legal Times.
52
Symposium: Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millennium
IDEOLOGY AND THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES
U.C. Davis Law Review
February, 2003
Erwin Chemerinsky
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
II. Ideology Always Has Mattered in Judicial
Selection
The debate over whether ideology should
matter in the judicial selection process has
been about whether it is appropriate for the
United States Senate to consider the views of
the prospective judge during the
confirmation process. No one seems to deny
that it is completely appropriate for the
President to consider ideology in making
appointments. Presidents, of course, always
have done so. Every President has appointed
primarily, if not almost exclusively,
individuals from the President's political
party. Ever since George Washington,
Presidents have looked to ideology in making
judicial picks. Some Presidents are more
ideological than others; not surprisingly,
these Presidents focus more on ideology in
their judicial nominations. President Franklin
Roosevelt, for example, wanted judges who
would uphold his "New Deal" programs and
President Ronald Reagan emphasized
selecting conservative jurists.
Senates always have done the same, using
ideology as a basis for evaluating presidential
nominees for the federal bench.
Early in American history, President George
Washington appointed John Rutledge to be
the second Chief Justice of the United States.
Rutledge was impeccably qualified; he
already had been confirmed by the Senate as
an Associate Justice (although he never
actually sat in that capacity). The Senate
rejected Rutledge for the position as Chief
Justice because of its disagreement with
Rutledge's views on the United States treaty
with Great Britain.
During the nineteenth century, the Senate
rejected twenty-one presidential nominations
for the United States Supreme Court. The
vast majority of these individuals were
defeated because of Senate disagreement
with their ideology. Professor Grover Rees
explains that "during the nineteenth century
only four Supreme Court Justices were
rejected on the ground that they lacked the
requisite credentials, whereas seventeen were
rejected for political or philosophical
reasons."
During the twentieth century, nominees for
the Supreme Court also were rejected solely
because of their ideology. In 1930, a federal
court of appeals judge, John Parker, was
denied a seat on the high Court because of his
anti-labor, anti-civil rights views. In 1970,
the Senate rejected United States Court of
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Appeals judge Clement Haynsworth largely
because of his anti- union views. The Senate
then rejected President Nixon's next pick for
the Supreme Court, federal court of appeals
judge Harold Carswell.
In 1987, the Senate rejected Robert Bork,
even though he had impeccable professional
qualifications and unquestioned ability.
Bork was rejected because of his unduly
restrictive views of constitutional law,
including rejecting constitutional protection
of a right to privacy, limiting freedom of
speech to political expression, and denying
protection for women under equal protection.
The defeat of Robert Bork was in line with a
tradition as old as the republic itself.
Those who contend that ideology should
play no role in judicial selection are arguing
for a radical change from how the process has
worked from the earliest days of the nation.
Never has the selection or confirmation
process focused solely on whether the
candidate has sufficient professional
credentials.
There is a widespread sense that the focus
on ideology has increased in recent years.
Indeed, this symposium, and others like it,
are a response to this concern. There are
several explanations for why there is intense
focus on ideology at this point in American
history. First, the demise in a belief in
formalism by the general public encourages a
focus on ideology. People increasingly have
come to recognize that law is not mechanical,
that judges often have great discretion in
deciding cases. People realize that how
judges rule on questions like abortion and
affirmative action and the death penalty and
countless other issues is a reflection of the
individual jurist's views. Bush v. Gore
simply reinforced the widespread belief that
the political views of judges often determine
how they vote in important cases. Thus,
Democratic voters want Democratic Senators
to block conservative nominees and
Republican voters want Republican Senators
to block liberal nominees. This creates a
political incentive for Senators to do so, and
means that they certainly do not risk
alienating their core constituency by using
ideology in evaluating nominees.
Second, the lack of "party government" in
recent years explains the increased focus on
ideology. During the last six years of the
Clinton presidency, the Republicans
controlled the Senate. During at least the
first two years of the current Bush presidency,
the Democrats have controlled the Senate. If
the Senate is of the same political party as the
President, there obviously will be many
fewer fights over judicial nominations.
Certainly, confirmation battles are still
possible, such as through filibusters, or if the
President lacks support from a faction of his
own party. But the reality is that
confirmation fights are usually a product of
the Senate and the President being from
different political parties.
Finally, confirmation fights occur when
there is the perception of deep ideological
divisions over issues likely to be decided by
the courts. Now, for example, conservatives
and liberals deeply disagree over countless
issues: the appropriate method of
constitutional interpretation; the desirable
scope of Congress' power and the judicial
role in limiting it; the content of individual
rights, such as privacy. It is widely
recognized that the outcome of cases
concerning these questions will be
determined by who is on the bench.
Therefore, senators know, and voters
recognize, that the confirmation process is
enormously important in deciding the
content of the law. Interest groups on both
sides of the ideological divide have strong
reasons for making judicial confirmation a
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high priority because they know what is at
stake in who occupies the federal bench.
III. Ideology Should Be
Judicial Selection and
Confirmation Process
Considered in the
Of course, the above description is not a
normative defense of the desirability of
considering ideology in evaluating judicial
nominees. Normatively, there are many
reasons why ideology should be considered
in the judicial selection process.
First, most simply and most importantly,
ideology should be considered because
ideology matters. Judges are not fungible; a
person's ideology influences how he or she
will vote on important issues. It is
appropriate for an evaluator--the President,
the Senate, the voters in states with judicial
elections--to pay careful attention to the
likely consequences of an individual's
presence on the court.
This seems so obvious as to hardly require
elaboration. Imagine that the President
appoints someone who turns out to be an
active member of the Ku Klux Klan or the
American Nazi Party and repeatedly has
expressed racist or anti-semitic views.
Assume that the individual has impeccable
professional qualifications: a degree from a
prestigious university, years of experience in
high level law practice, and a strong record of
bar service. I would think that virtually
everyone would agree that the nominee
should be rejected. If I am correct in this
assumption, then everyone agrees that
ideology should matter and the only issue is
what views should be a basis for excluding a
person from holding judicial office.
On the Supreme Court, the decisions in a
large proportion of cases are a product of the
judges' views. The federalism decisions of
recent years--limiting the scope of Congress'
powers under the commerce clause and
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
reviving the Tenth Amendment as a limit on
federal power, and the expansion of
sovereign immunity--almost all have been 5-
4 rulings that reflect the ideology of the
Justices.12 Beyond the obvious controversial
issues, like abortion, affirmative action, and
the death penalty, virtually all cases about
individual liberties and civil rights are a
product of who is on the bench. Criminal
procedure cases often require balancing the
government's interests in law enforcement
against the rights of individuals; this
balancing will reflect the individual Justice's
views. Decisions in statutory cases, too, are a
result of the ideology of the Justices.
Frequently, in statutory civil rights cases, the
Court is split exactly along ideological lines.
Second, the Senate should use ideology
precisely because the President uses it.
Republicans, who today are arguing for the
Senate to approve nominations without
regard to their views, are being disingenuous
when there is a President who is basing his
picks so much on ideology. Under the
Constitution, the Senate should not be a
rubber-stamp and should not treat judicial
selection as a presidential prerogative. The
Senate owes no duty of deference to the
president and, as explained above, never has
shown such deference through American
history.
Finally, ideology should be considered
because the judicial selection process is the
key majoritarian check on an
12 See, e.g., University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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anti-majoritarian institution. Once
confirmed, federal judges have life tenure. A
crucial democratic check is the process of
determining who will hold these
appointments. A great deal of constitutional
scholarship in the last quarter of a century has
focused on what Professor Alexander Bickel
termed the "counter-maj oritarian
difficulty"--the exercise of substantial power
by unelected judges who can invalidate the
decisions of elected officials. The most
significant majoritarian check is at the
nomination and confirmation stage.
Selection by the President and confirmation
by the Senate properly exists to have
majoritarian control over the composition of
the federal courts.
Opponents to the use of ideology in the
judicial selection process must sustain one of
two arguments: either that an individual's
ideology is unlikely to affect his or her
decisions on the bench, or that even if
ideology will influence decisions, it should
not be examined because disadvantages to
such consideration will outweigh any
advantage.
The former argument, that a person's
ideology is unlikely to affect performance in
office, is impossible to sustain. Unless one
believes in truly mechanistic judging, it is
clear that judges possess discretion and that
the exercise of discretion is strongly
influenced by an individual's preexisting
ideological beliefs. In cases involving
questions of constitutional or statutory
interpretation, the language of the document
and the intent of the drafters often will be
unclear. Judges have to decide the meaning,
and this often will be a product of their views.
Many cases, especially in constitutional law,
require a balancing of interests. The relative
weight assigned to the respective claims
often turns on the judge's values. Given the
reality of judicial decision making, it is
impossible to claim that a judge's ideology
will not impact his or her decisions.
Opposition to considering ideology must be
based on the latter argument: that even
though ideology matters, it is undesirable to
consider it. One argument is that having the
Senate consider ideology will undermine
judicial independence. Professor Stephen
Carter makes this argument:
[I]f a nominee's ideas fall within the very
broad range of judicial views that are not
radical in any nontrivial sense--and Robert
Bork has as much right to that middle ground
as any other nominee in recent decades--the
Senate enacts a terrible threat to the
independence of the judiciary if a substantive
review of the nominee's legal theories brings
about a rejection.15
But Professor Carter never explains why
judicial independence requires blindness to
ideology during the confirmation or selection
of a federal judge. Judicial independence
means that a judge should feel free to decide
cases according to his or her view of the law
and not in response to popular pressure. As
such, Article III's assurance of life tenure and
its protection against a reduction in salaries,
provide independence. Judges are free to
decide each case according to their
conscience and best judgment; they need not
worry that their rulings will cause them to be
ousted from office. Professor Carter never
justifies why this is insufficient to protect
judicial independence. He subtly shifts the
definition of independence from autonomy
while in office to autonomy from scrutiny
before taking office. But he does not explain
why the latter, freedom from evaluation
before ascending to the bench, is a
Stephen Carter, Essays on the Supreme Court
Appointment Process: The Confirmation Mess, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1988).
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prerequisite for judicial independence in the
former, far more meaningful sense.
Another argument against considering
ideology is that it will deadlock the selection
process--liberals will block conservatives
and vice versa. The reality is that this is a
risk only when the Senate and the President
are from different political parties. Even then,
every Senate--including the Republican
Senate during the Clinton years and the
Democratic Senate today--has approved a
large number of presidential nominations for
the federal bench. There have been times
when a number of nominations have been
rejected, such as the Senate defeating every
pick for the Supreme Court by President
Tyler and rejecting two nominations in a row
by President Nixon. But in over 200 years of
history, deadlocks have been rare.
Most importantly, at times like now, when
the Senate and the President are controlled by
different parties, the solution to deadlocks is
in the President's hands: nominate
individuals who will be acceptable to the
Senate. Presidents will have to select more
moderate individuals than if the Senate was
controlled by their political party. President
Clinton undoubtedly was forced to select less
liberal, more moderate judges, because the
Senate was Republican-controlled for the last
six years of his presidency. President Bush
would be far more successful in getting his
nominations through the Senate if he chose
less conservative individuals. The President
has the prerogative to pick conservatives like
Charles Pickering, Priscilla Owens, Carolyn
Kuhl, and Miguel Estrada, but he should
expect resistance in a Democratic Senate that
would not be there if Bush selected more
moderate nominees. When President Bush
has picked moderates for the federal courts of
appeals, they have sailed through the
confirmation process. For example, the
Senate quickly confirmed Bush's selections
of Reena Raggi for the Second Circuit and
Harrison Hartz for the Tenth Circuit.
Finally, some suggest that using ideology is
undesirable because it will encourage judges
to base their rulings on ideology. The
argument is that ideology has to be hidden
from the process to limit the likelihood that
once on the bench judges will base their
decisions on ideology. This argument is
based on numerous unsupportable
assumptions: it assumes that it is possible for
judges to decide cases apart from their views
and ideology; it assumes that judges do not
already often decide cases because of their
views and ideology; it assumes that
considering ideology in the selection process
will increase this in deciding cases. All of
these are simply false. Long ago, the Legal
Realists exploded the myth of formalistic
value-neutral judging. Having the judicial
confirmation process recognize the demise of
formalism won't change a thing in how
judges behave on the bench.
In summary, the argument for considering
ideology in judicial selection is simple:
people should care about the decisions likely
to come from a court on important issues; the
ideological composition of the court will
determine those decisions; and the
appropriate place for majoritarian influences
in the judicial process is at the selection
stage.
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I. The Framers of the Constitution Assigned
to the President the Pre-Eminent
Role in Appointing Judges
B. The Framers Envisioned a Narrow Role
for the Senate in the Confirmation Process
Of course, there is more to the appointment
power than the power to nominate, and the
Senate unquestionably has a role to play in
the confirmation phase of the appointment
process. But the role envisioned by the
framers was as a check on improper
appointments by the President, one that
would not undermine the President's ultimate
responsibility for the appointments he made.
As James Iredell, later a Justice of the
Supreme Court, noted during the North
Carolina Ratification Convention: "[a]s to
offices, the Senate has no other influence but
a restraint on improper appointments . . . .
This, in effect, is but a restriction on the
President."
The degree to which the founders viewed
the power of appointment as being vested
solely in the President can be gauged by the
fact that John Adams objected even to the
Senate's limited confirmation role,
contending that it "lessens the responsibility
of the president." To Adams, the President
should be solely responsible for his choices,
and should alone pay the price for choosing
unfit nominees. Under the current system,
Adams complained, "Who can censure [the
President] without censuring the senate. . .?
The appointment power is, Adams wrote, an
"executive matter[]," which should be left
entirely to "the management of the
executive." James Wilson echoed this view:
"The person who nominates or makes
appointments to offices, should be known.
His own office, his own character, his own
fortune should be responsible. He should be
alike unfettered and unsheltered by
counselors."
The Senate's confirmation power therefore
acts as a relatively minor check on the
President's authority. It exists only to prevent
the President from selecting a nominee who
"does not possess due qualifications for
office." Essentially, the Senate's
confirmation power exists to prevent the
President from being swayed by nepotism or
mere political opportunism. Assessing a
candidate's "qualifications for office" did not
give the Senate grounds for imposing an
ideological litmus on the President's
nominees, at least where the questioned
ideology did not prevent a judge from
fulfilling his oath of office.
C. Ideology Was Not Considered a Proper
Reason for Refusing Confirmation, as Long
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as It Did Not Prevent the Nominee From
Fulfilling the Judicial Oath
In the founders' view, then, the Senate's
power in the confirmation of judicial
appointees was extremely limited. It existed
primarily, if not solely, to prevent the
President from exercising his power in an
improper manner. Ideology--at least
ideology of the kind that is unrelated to a
candidate's ability to fulfill his oath of
office--simply had no place in the Senate's
decision....
II. The Current State of the Confirmation
Power
A. Why Ideology Matters to the Left
Despite the original understanding of the
Senate's limited role in the confirmation
process, and despite the lessons learned from
these early historical flirtations with the use
of political ideology as a criteria for judicial
confirmation, the Senate today appears bent
on using its limited confirmation power to
impose ideological litmus tests on
presidential nominees. In this way, the
Senate seems to be arrogating to itself the
nomination as well as the confirmation
power.
The Senate's expanded use of its
confirmation power should perhaps come as
no surprise. As a result of the growing role of
the judiciary, the Senate's part in the
nomination process has become a powerful
political tool. And, like any powerful
political tool, it is the subject of a strenuous
competition among interest groups every
time the President seeks to fill a judicial
vacancy. Nevertheless, it is a tool that poses
grave dangers to our constitutional system of
government. In its current manifestation, the
Senate's ideological use of the confirmation
power threatens the separation of powers in
three ways. First, it undermines the
responsibility for appointments given to the
President. Second, it demands of judicial
nominees a commitment to a role not
appropriate to the courts. Third, and, perhaps
most importantly, the Senate's ideological
use of the confirmation power threatens the
separation of powers by threatening the
independence of the judiciary itself.
B. The Dangerous Tactics of Today's
Judicial Confirmation Process
One of the most disturbing manifestations
of the new process is the growing tendency of
the Senate to refuse even to hold hearings for
nominees. This practice suggests not that the
nominees are too far outside the ideological
mainstream to be confirmed, but rather that
the Senators fear to vote down the nominees
on ideological grounds, precisely because
they are not outside the ideological
mainstream.
Even those who argue that the Senate
should take a large role in molding the
judiciary must acknowledge that blocking
nominations by refusing to hold hearings is
an inappropriate tactic. The Senate has the
power to advise and consent to a President's
nominees. The refusal to hold hearings at all
is not advice or consent; it is political
blackmail which perpetuates the critical
number of vacancies on the federal bench. In
fact, as one author has noted, senatorial
inaction is contrary to a resolution passed by
the very first Senate in 1789. "When
nominations shall be made in writing by the
President of the United States to the Senate, a
future day shall be assigned, unless the
Senate unanimously direct otherwise, for
taking them into consideration . . . and the
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Senators shall signify their assent or dissent
by answering, viva voce, ay or no."
Moreover, the current strategy of delay that
appears to be the mainstay of the present
Senate Judiciary Committee threatens to
intrude upon the Executive's powers, in
violation of core separation of powers
principles. Improper attempts to impose
ideological litmus tests by voting down the
President's nominees could be countered by
re-nomination of like-minded individuals,
but the outright refusal to hold hearings, or to
refer nominees to the floor of the Senate for a
vote, deprives the President of even this
remedial power. Such a tactic eventually
forces the President to accede to demands to
nominate individuals more to the liking of
individual Senators. The delay tactics appear
designed, then, to transfer the nomination
power from the President to the Senate, a
result that the founders greatly feared.
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